In the 2023 Dutch national elections, the issue of hosting nuclear weapons did not prominently feature, but there exist subtle differences among the major political parties on this and related topics like NATO and defense spending. Among the five parties with the biggest shares of votes in the 2023 election (PVV, GroenLinks-PvdA, VVD, NSC, and D66), the far-right PVV stands alone in not endorsing the goal of allocating two percent of GDP to national defense. This stance reflects its broader hesitancy towards multinational defense initiatives, as evidenced by its party program which rules out a European army or enhanced defense cooperation with Germany, while framing national border protection as a topic of security and defense.
Regarding nuclear weapons, the PVV, NSC, and D66 do not address the issue in their party platforms, whereas VVD explicitly supports the continuation of hosting nuclear weapons. Only GroenLinks-PvdA, a coalition of the Dutch Green and Labour parties, allocates a full paragraph to nuclear disarmament, subtly suggesting that the Netherlands might join the ranks of non-nuclear states in the event of successful future nuclear disarmament initiatives. However, generally, the topic is increasingly avoided: Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, even traditional champions of nuclear disarmament, such as D66, GroenLinks, and Pieter Omtzigt, a former CDA member who now leads NSC, have largely refrained from discussing U.S. nuclear weapons.
While there was a lack of discussions throughout the 2023 election campaign, the legislative chamber of the Dutch parliament (Tweede Kamer) has a history of frequently debating the hosting of US nuclear weapons in the Netherlands, unlike other host states. Indeed, since 2012 alone it held more than 40 votes on the matter. However, even motions that pass are not legally binding on the government which enjoys considerable freedom of action in the foreign policy realm. Still, upon parliamentary pressure, the Dutch government was the only NATO state participating in the negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), although it ultimately voted against it. In 2022, Dutch MP Jasper van Dijk successfully introduced a motion to pressure the Dutch government to send a delegation to the first meeting of states parties (MSP1) of the TPNW. However, based on the Foreign Affairs Ministry’s assessment of further participation as unproductive, the Netherlands chose not to attend the second meeting of states parties (MSP2) in 2023. In 2022, van Dijk also pressed the government to provide information on the modernization of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands through another successful motion. While securing only 3.5 percent of the votes in the 2023 election, van Dijk and his party, the Socialists, remain steadfast advocates for nuclear abolition. In fact, their party program asserts that nuclear weapons have “no place” in the Netherlands.
Despite frequent parliamentarian initiatives, Dutch governments have been largely supportive of the existing nuclear order, including their own participation in hosting nuclear weapons. For example, while being pressured to attend the first meeting of states parties of the TPNW, the Dutch government stressed in its address to the meeting that the NPT remains the only valuable option toward nuclear disarmament and that the Dutch government is committed to NATO and its own nuclear role in the alliance. However, in 2010, the Dutch government had joined calls for an end to hosting nuclear weapons, spurred by then US President Barack Obama’s Prague Speech and German leadership on the question.
In its Integrated International Security Strategy 2018-2022, the Dutch government notes that the Netherlands itself relies in its security on nuclear deterrence and thus, keeping the dangers in mind, would stand for a balanced approach when it comes to nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. It also stated that it will continue to meet its obligations with regard to nuclear tasks in NATO. Neither the 2022 Defense White Paper, nor the 2023 Security Strategy outline the Dutch position toward NATO’s nuclear policy (unlike for example similar German documents published in recent years).
In the 2010s, the Netherlands witnessed a limited public debate on the pros and cons of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, but the debate never gained as much traction as it did in Germany during the same period. However, similar themes echoed those in the German debate, centering on deterrence versus risks, and having a say in NATO versus maintaining credibility as a disarmament advocate.