The first nuclear weapon deployments to the Netherlands took place in the early 1960s with Honest John and nuclear bombs arriving, and shortly after that, 8-inch Howitzer artillery. Dutch Defense Minister Cornelis Staf had already raised the issue of nuclear deployments to the Netherlands at a NATO meeting in 1956. The Dutch interest in hosting nuclear weapons was primarily driven by three reasons:
1) Economically, the presence of nuclear weapons would reduce U.S. pressure on the Netherlands to boost investments in conventional forces during their economic rebuilding phase.
2) From a status perspective, participation in a nuclear NATO was believed to enhance Dutch influence more than the formation of a European nuclear defense entity would.
3) On a military front, introducing nuclear weapons to both the Netherlands and Germany would mean the line of defense could be moved from the Dutch border further into German territory.
By 1957, the US Military Assistance Advisory Group had prepared a letter to inform the Dutch about the conditions under which such deployments could take place. In May 1959, the United States and the Netherlands signed an agreement that contained a secret technical and security annex, stipulating that nuclear weapons would be deployed to the Netherlands and should be immediately available in case of war. A year later, the first nuclear bombs arrived on Dutch territory. Some of the systems, such as the Honest John, were given to the Netherlands under the 1959 Mutual Defense Assistance Act, allowing the United States to lend weaponry to its allies. The United States was positively impressed with the Dutch commitment to nuclear sharing and its “no-nonsense attitude” regarding NATO’s common defense (see below).
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Figure : Diplomatic cable between the US embassy in the Hague and the US Department of State, 1959; International Institute of Social History, Collectie Cees Wiebes, 228.2A
The systems deployed to the Netherlands were designed for nuclear warfighting, not only deterrence. For example, the Honest John was the first nuclear-capable surface-to-surface rocket the United States had developed. Similarly, the 8-inch Howitzer was designed to be used for surface-to-surface attacks. Nuclear artillery shells of the W33 type were to be introduced into the cannon of the 8-inch Howitzer and shot up to a distance of 18 km. Later, the nuclear artillery shells W79 could reach up to 30 km. Similarly, the Honest John rocket could not reach targets beyond 50 km, even in later versions of the rocket. Thus, these systems were ideal-type battlefield nuclear weapons, designed to be used in accordance with NATO’s flexible response doctrine in which any incoming assaults by the Warsaw Pact would be stopped by escalating to the nuclear level and using battlefield nuclear weapons.
Figure : Rear view of an Honest John nuclear-capable rocket at the Dutch National Military Museum in Soestberg; Wikimedia Commons; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HonestJohn_rearview_Soesterberg.JPG
Nuclear weapons operated by the Netherlands were not only stationed in the country itself, but also in Germany and the United Kingdom. In the late 1960s, the Dutch Navy had signed an additional technical agreement with its U.S. and British counterparts, to permit Dutch Neptune aircraft and later P-3 Orion aircraft stationed at Valkenburg Air Base to deploy nuclear depth bombs stored in the United Kingdom at St. Mawgan. In addition, since around 1965, Dutch forces were also assigned to nuclear delivery vehicles in Germany. For example, the nuclear armed Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles at Erle in North Rhine-Westphalia were operated by the Royal Netherlands Army. In addition, the I Netherlands Corps was allocated Atomic Demolition Munition deployed in Germany beginning in 1962. These atomic mines were designed to stop or divert incoming enemy forces. Dutch military personnel with nuclear roles remained present in Germany until the late Cold War. For instance, in the early 1980s, there were Dutch Air Force Nike Hercules units at Borgholzhausen, Bramsche, and Rheine-Elte, and the Dutch army provided the security for nuclear storage sites at Bueren. Indeed, such arrangements were not uncommon. Next to the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom operated nuclear delivery systems in Germany. These systems were equipped with American nuclear warheads that remained under the exclusive custody of US forces.
Figure : Casing for the W54/Special Atomic Demolition Munition (nuclear mine); Wikimedia Commons; https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_Demolition_Munitions#/media/Datei:SADM(cropped).jpg
By 1979 the nuclear-capable Honest Johns stationed in the Netherlands were replaced by the MGM-52 Lance, a more modern surface-to-surface missile. While precise details regarding the count of warheads and delivery systems at particular times often remains elusive, it is known that around 1985, approximately 81 warheads were positioned in the Netherlands. Out of these, 42 were Lance munitions, 14 were 8-inch artillery munitions, and 25 were bombs designated for delivery by Dutch aircraft.
Throughout the Euromissile episode in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, the Netherlands held a unique position. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was adamant about ensuring a wide participation of European powers in hosting the Pershing II and/or Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (Gryphons). However, by 1983, out of the possible host states, only the Dutch and Belgian governments remained undecided if they were to host Gryphons, while Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany had accepted the deployments which were already ongoing. Pressured by the largest protests the country had ever witnessed, organized to considerable degree by the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), and unfavorable opinion polls (e.g. one poll in 1984 found 63 percent of Dutch citizens to oppose the deployments), Ruud Lubbers’ government took an unconventional decision: If the Soviet Union were to field more than 378 SS-20 missiles by November 1985, the Netherlands would host the Gryphons at Woendsrecht Air Base. The Dutch government was further isolated when in March 1985 the Belgian government agreed to accept the deployment of Gryphons. Eventually, on November 1, 1985, the Netherlands also permitted to host the missiles. However, before preparations for the deployment of Gryphons to Woendsrecht Air Base could be concluded, the US and the Soviet Union had signed the INF Treaty in 1987, cancelling all existing and future intermediate-range nuclear force deployments at the time.
The conclusion of the Cold War marked a significant turning point as the majority of nuclear weapons were withdrawn. This encompassed not only the weapons positioned within the Netherlands but also those earmarked for Dutch forces situated in Germany. What endured were the B-61 nuclear bombs stationed at Volkel Air Base. Following the Cold War era, about 20 nuclear bombs remained on the Air Base. Today, the count hovers around 15. In case of war, they would be used by Dutch pilots.